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“[I]n this world, with great power there must also come—great
responsibility.”1
I. BACKGROUND—CAVEAT EMPTOR
“Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”2 form the cornerstones
of American independence. Having freed themselves from the yoke of
colonial oppression while living on a continent resplendent with natural
resources, Americans were imbued with an abundant source of
individualism.3 By 1787, the United States Constitution recognized that
a government with limited powers was not welcome to intrude upon free
enterprise.4 Merchants in America were free to determine the saleable
qualities of their goods.5 The interaction between a merchant and a
consumer was governed by the presumption in favor of the freedom of
contract.6
Historically, aggrieved consumers could seek a remedy by filing an
action against a merchant and the judiciary would determine whether any
impropriety tainted the transaction. In their moving papers the
complainant would be required to plead common law causes of action in
either contract or tort law. The policy of minimal government
intervention in transactions between private parties predominated
America’s economic landscape. The results of legal actions would
largely be governed by the aphorism caveat emptor, “let the buyer
beware.” Judicial reliance on this maxim was often predicated upon the
belief that buyers and sellers, before the industrial revolution, had an
equal responsibility to judge the quality of the goods being sold. 7 These
individuals, negotiating at “arm’s length,” were thought to be in equal
position to one another and therefore competent to judge both the goods
and services being bought and sold in the marketplace.

1

Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (citing Stan Lee & Steve
Ditko, Introducing Spider Man, Amazing Fantasy, Aug. 1962, at 13.
2
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, at ⁋ 2 (1776).
3
Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1183
(1931).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Michael S. Greve, Consumer Law, Class Actions and the Common Law, 7 CHAP. L.
REV. 155, 157 (2004).
7
See JOANNA SHEPHERD, AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., THE EXPANSION OF NEW JERSEY’S
CONSUMER FRAUD ACT: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 3 (2014). See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen,
The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 53 AM. L. REG. 273, 337-38 (1905);
Hamilton, supra note 3.
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A. Early New Jersey Case Law
The 1793 case of Mason v. Evans involved an “action of debt” on a
bond.8 The Supreme Court of Judicature of New Jersey, in its opinion,
noted that there was a cause of action available to the defendant, an
“action of covenant on his warranty.”9 The court further noted that if the
defendant “omit[ted] that prudent precaution, the maxim of caveat
emptor [was] fairly applicable.”10 One year later, in 1794, the Supreme
Court of Judicature of New Jersey issued its opinion in the case of
Journey v. Hunt.11 In addressing the seller’s vague representations
regarding a tract of land the Court held, “[t]he purchaser in every case,
more especially when the representation is couched in . . . ambiguous and
general words . . . [should] satisfy himself of the quality of the land by
previous inquiry or personal examination.”12 The Court went on to hold
that, “[t]he maxim of caveat emptor is a just and valuable one, and its
application to a case like the present cannot be considered harsh or
iniquitous.”13 This legal principle, which placed a burden upon the buyer
to check both the quality and suitability of goods before a purchase,
appeared to be embedded in the Garden State’s jurisprudence.
Furthermore, these cautionary watchwords would not be limited in their
application to transactions involving land.
The onus placed upon buyers to investigate the nature or quality of
commodities and chattel arose in the case of Renton v. Maryott.14 A
mortgagee sold the shares of a mining company to a mortgagor for
$1,000.15 During the course of the transaction, the mortgagee represented
that he had paid $1,000 for the shares of stock, which ultimately turned
out to be worthless.16 The Court held, “[t]he rule of caveat emptor applies
as well to the sale of stocks as of chattels.”17 The exception to this “rule”
was that the vendor would only be found liable for misrepresentations or
fraud.18
Historically, New Jersey Courts required the complainant to
8

Mason v. Evans, 1 N.J.L. 182, 182 (1793).
Id. at 189.
10
Id.
11
Journey v. Hunt, 1 N.J.L. 235, 235 (1794).
12
Id. at 237.
13
Id. (citations omitted).
14
Renton v. Maryott, 21 N.J. Eq. 123, 123 (1870).
15
Id. Adjusted for inflation $1,000 in 1870 is the equivalent of $17,997.91 in 2017. See
Inflation Calculator, OFFICIALDATA.ORG, http://www.in2013dollars.com/1870-dollars-in2017?amount=1000 (last visited May 10, 2018).
16
Renton, 21 N.J. Eq. at 124.
17
Id.
18
Id.
9
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specifically plead fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit.19 In addition, the
complainant was required to set forth specific damages in their
complaint.20 Where a party failed to articulate, with specificity, the
circumstances of the fraud and misrepresentation, the dismissal of the
cause or the reversal of the judgment was frequently the result.21
Lawsuits based on misrepresentation or fraud were often difficult and
expensive for the consumer to prove.22 Frequently, the expense of
pursuing a fraud claim far outweighed the damage award for the
successful prosecution of such a claim.23 In the early part of 1870, the
United States Congress began a movement toward consumer protection.
B. The Mail Fraud Act of 1872
The Mail Fraud Act24 was one of the earliest consumer protection
statutes promulgated by the United States government. During the
debate, Representative Farnsworth identified the villains whose
predatory behavior the Mail Fraud Act was designed to curtail.25 In his
opinion, the mail fraud statute was essential “to prevent the frauds which
are mostly gotten up in the large cities . . . by thieves, forgers and
rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the
innocent people in the country.” 26 In an effort to deter fraudulent
behavior, the Mail Fraud Act made it a misdemeanor to effectuate a
“scheme or artifice to defraud” another by means of “the post-office
establishment of the United States.”27 If found guilty of violating the
Mail Fraud Act, the perpetrator faced up to a $500 fine and up to eighteen
calendar months in prison.28 Ne’er-do-wells who utilized the postal
system to perpetrate their frauds were not the only individuals gaining the
attention of the federal government and the public.
C. The Bureau of Corporations
On February 14, 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt created the
19

Lummis v. Stratton, 2 N.J.L. 229, 230 (1807).
Id.
21
Sexton v. Cramer, 3 N.J.L. 908, 908 (1811).
22
See Mason v. Evans, 1 N.J.L. 182, 184-85 (1793).
23
Id. See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE
LAW § 10:1 (2013); see also Jason M. Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1749,
1766-67 (2007). See also infra Section II.D., for a discussion on the economic impact of the
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.
24
Act of June. 8, 1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 323 (1872).
25
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987).
26
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (remarks of Representative Farnsworth).
27
Act of June. 8, 1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 323 (1872).
28
Id.
20
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Bureau of Corporations.29 The Bureau had the far-reaching power to
make “diligent investigation into the organization, conduct and
management of the business of any corporation, joint stock company or
corporate combination engaged in commerce among the several States”30
and to inspect the corporate ledgers of all companies engaged in interstate
commerce.31 During the course of their investigation, the Bureau could
“subpoena and compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
production of documentary evidence and to administer oaths.”32
Information concerning corporations engaged in interstate, intrastate or
foreign commerce would then be gathered, compiled and published by
the Bureau. The information gathered by the Bureau of Corporations was
designed to “enable the President of the United States to make
recommendations
to
Congress
for
legislation
[to]
regulat[e]. . .commerce.”33 This entity would serve as the predecessor to
the Federal Trade Commission.34
D. The Jungle
In 1905, author Upton Sinclair serialized the disturbing experience
of a Lithuanian immigrant living in Chicago and working in the
meatpacking industry. These articles were published in the Socialist
magazine “Appeal to Reason.”35 The installments were eventually
collected and published as a book published under the name, The Jungle.
In addition to detailing the horrific working conditions endured by the
meatpacking workers, the book also set forth what can conservatively be
described as “grotesque descriptions” of the contaminated food produced
by this then unregulated industry.36
The original point of Sinclair’s exposé was to bring the
dehumanization of workers and the brutal treatment of animals to the
public’s attention.37 The readers, however, chose to focus on the health
risks associated with unsanitary stockyards and meatpacking facilities.38
Shortly after the book was published, the White House received “100
29

An Act to Establish the Department of Commerce and Labor, ch. 548, § 6 (1903).
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. For a discussion of the Federal Trade Commission, see infra Section E.
35
Daniel E. Slotnik, Upton Sinclair, Whose Muckraking Changed the Meat Industry,
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/obituaries/arc
hives/upton-sinclair-meat-industry.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
30
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letters a day demanding a Federal cleanup of the meat industry.”39 The
outrage of the American citizenry, ignited by the investigative journalism
of The Jungle, is often credited with being the impetus for the creation of
the Food & Drug Administration.40
To say that Upton Sinclair had gained the attention of the President
of the United States is an understatement. The two gentlemen frequently
exchanged correspondence. The issues set forth in The Jungle were
among the topics that Upton Sinclair discussed with President Theodore
Roosevelt.41 Alarmed by the book’s content, as well as the allegations
set forth in Sinclair’s correspondence, the President was compelled to
declare that, “the specific evils you point out shall, if their existence be
proved, and if I have power, be eradicated.” With that letter, the
executive branch of government began what would be a long-standing
commitment to combatting socio-economic evil in the marketplace.
E. The Federal Trade Commission
The Bureau of Corporations served as the predecessor to the Federal
Trade Commission.42 An act to create the Federal Trade Commission, to
define its powers and duties, was enacted on September 26, 1914.43 The
Act authorized the President to appoint, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, a bipartisan commission consisting of five commissioners.44
Since Franklin D. Roosevelt symbolically set the cornerstone of the
Commission’s headquarters, the Federal Trade Commission (“F.T.C.”)
has maintained the unique dual missions of protecting consumers through
the prohibition of unfair methods and promoting competition in interstate
commerce.45 During the early part of the Twentieth Century, Congress
was primarily concerned with corporate monopolies. The F.T.C.’s
mandate was to regulate “unfair methods of competition.”46 This goal
rests solely within the domain of the F.T.C., because the Act did not

39

Id. (quoting Alden Whitman, author of Sinclair’s obituary).
Spencer Weber Waller, Jillian G. Brady & R.J. Acosta, Consumer Protection in the
United States: An Overview, EUR. J. OF CONSUMER L., May 2011, at 1.
41
Letter from Upton Sinclar, Author, to Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. President (March 10,
1906), (on file at Records of the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture).
42
Our History, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history (last
visited May 10, 2018); see also supra Section C.
43
An Act to Create a Federal Trade Commission, to Define its Powers and Duties, and
for other purposes, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
44
Id. at § 1.
45
What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last
visited May 10, 2018).
46
Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
45).
40
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provide for private actions.47 The limits of the F.T.C.’s authority would
not go unnoticed by the United States Supreme Court.
In 1931, the Raladam Company manufactured and distributed a
concoction known as “Marmola” to wholesalers, retailers and ultimately
consumers.48 This product, which was to be ingested by its purchaser,
was marketed as an “obesity cure.”49 Advertisements for this product
were circulated in the United States.50 These advertisements, as well as
the printed labels, specified that “the preparation [was] of scientific
research, knowledge, and accuracy,” and “that it is safe and effective and
may be used without discomfort, inconvenience, or danger or harmful
results to health.”51 The F.T.C., under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act,52 issued a complaint against the Raladam Company
charging them with unfair methods of competition in interstate
commerce.53 The F.T.C. ordered the Raladam Company to “cease and
desist” from representing its “obesity cure” as a scientifically tested
method for treating and curing obesity.54 Further, the F.T.C. ordered that
statements regarding this “cure” could not be made, unless accompanied
by a statement that it could not be taken safely except under medical
direction.55 The Raladam Company, disquieted by the decision of the
F.T.C., appealed the order of injunction.56
The Court of Appeals was then called upon, by Raladam, to review
the action of the Commission.57 After reviewing the action, the court
reversed the injunction issued by the F.T.C.58 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and dealt solely with the issue of jurisdiction.59 The
Supreme Court held that the Commission’s authority to issue a final order
to “cease and desist” is predicated upon the existence of “competition.”60
In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
47
The enumeration of private actions under state consumer protection statutes, serves as
a primary distinction between the F.T.C. Act and Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs).
48
DEAN K FUEROGHNE, LAW & ADVERTISING: A GUIDE TO CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 39
(2017).
49
F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 644 (1931).
50
Id. at 645.
51
Id.
52
Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
45).
53
Raladam, 283 U.S. at 644.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 646.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Raladam, 283 U.S. at 646.
60
Id. at 654.
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warned the F.T.C. that it could not give itself jurisdiction to make such
an order if none existed.61 The Court concluded, “if . . . it turn[s] out that
the preliminary assumption of competition is without foundation,
jurisdiction to make [a final cease and desist order] necessarily fails, and
the proceeding must be dismissed by the Commission.”62 Thus, it was
clear to the F.T.C., and to merchants, that the Supreme Court of the
United States would not extend the powers of the F.T.C. beyond those
enacted by Congress. In the years that followed, the decision of the Court
would be the subject of discussion among the Commissioners.
Heretofore, the F.T.C.’s power was limited to curtailing corporate
practices that unfairly affected competition in the marketplace among
businesses.
In 1935, however, the Commission sought, “clear
jurisdiction over a practice which is unfair or deceptive to the public”
even if this practice did not affect a competitor.63 The Commission noted
that, “[t]here are times when [an unfair or deceptive] practice is so
universal in an industry that the public is primarily injured rather than
individual competitors. In such cases it is very difficult, if not impossible,
to show injury to competitors, but the injury to the public is manifest.”
The Annual Report issued by the F.T.C. recommended a modification to
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The proposed
amendment sought to extend the powers of the F.T.C., “. . . so as to
specifically prohibit not only unfair methods of competition in commerce
but also unfair or deceptive acts and practices in commerce.” 64 The
F.T.C.’s recommendation to expand its authority, eventually adopted by
Congress,65 would serve as the basis for modern consumer protection
law.66 Before the F.T.C. would be vested with this authority, the Supreme
Court would be asked to examine yet another “cease and desist” order
issued by the Commission.
After service of a complaint, and extensive hearings, the F.T.C.
made findings of fact from testimony and ordered the Standard Education
61

Id.
Id. See generally F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149 (1945) (affirming an injunction
against Raladam and holding that the F.T.C. “found with meticulous particularity” that
Raladam had made many misleading and deceptive statements which had the “tendency and
capacity” to induce people to purchase their product in preference and to the exclusion of
products of competitors).
63
AN. REP. OF THE FED. TRADE COMM’N FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30 1935 15
(1935), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/annual-report-193
5/ ar1935_0.pdf .
64
Id.
65
Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) 2000)).
66
Victor E. Shwartz & Cary Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer
Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 8 (2005).
62
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Society to “cease and desist” from certain practices used in furthering the
sales of books in interstate commerce.67 The Commission made specific
findings that the defendant’s practices were “unfair, false, deceptive and
misleading.”68 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
however, both modified and weakened the Commission’s Order
concluding,
we cannot take too seriously the suggestion that a man who
is buying a set of books and a ten years’ extension service
will be fatuous enough to be misled by the mere statement
that they are given away, and that he is paying only for the
second. Such trivial niceties are to impalpable for practical
affairs, they are will-o’-the
wisps, which divert attention from
substantial evils.69
By this time, both the executive and legislative branches of government
had embraced the concept of consumer protection. In 1937, the decision
of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit would force the
F.T.C. to bring the issue of consumer protection directly to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Upon application by the F.T.C., the Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari.70 After reviewing the holding of the Court of
Appeals, Justice Black, delivering the opinion of the court, stated,
[t]he fact that a false statement may be obviously false to
those who are trained and experienced does not change its
character, nor take away its power to deceive others less
experienced. There is no duty resting upon a citizen to
suspect the honesty of those with whom he transacts business.
Laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the
suspicious. The best element of business has long since
decided that honesty should govern competitive enterprises,
and that the rule of caveat emptor should not be relied upon
to reward fraud and deception.
This holding cautioned that unsavory business practices would not be
tolerated in this Country. One year later, that statement would “apply
with even greater force.”71 In 1938, Congress passed the Wheeler-Lea
Act, which proscribed “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” as well as
“unfair methods of competition.”72
The Wheeler-Lea Act strengthened the power of the F.T.C. to fight
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices” employed by unscrupulous
67

F.T.C. v. Standard Educ. Soc., 58 U.S. 113, 113 (1937).
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
R.E. Freer, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address before the An. Convention
of the Proprietary Ass’n: The Wheeler Act (May 17, 1938).
72
Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, §3, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §45(a) 2000)).
68
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merchants.73 Congress appears to have purposely left these terms without
clear definitions. Rather than attempting to undertake the endless task of
enumerating these prohibited acts, Congress decided to “leave it to the
commission to determine what practices were unfair.”74 In vesting the
Commission with this superpower, Congress expected the Commission’s
members would “possess substantial business and commercial
backgrounds,” enabling them to distinguish “malevolent business
practices harming consumers from disingenuous claims of ‘unfairness’
prompted only by consumer litigation.”75 The F.T.C., strengthened by
the Wheeler-Lea Act, initially enjoyed tremendous popularity.
In time, the popularity of the F.T.C. would wane and the
Commission would not be without its detractors.76 By the middle of the
twentieth century the F.T.C. was seen by some as, “. . . rudderless; poorly
managed and poorly staffed; obsessed with trivia; politicized; all in all,
inefficient and incompetent.”77 In addition, there was a growing
frustration among consumers with common law causes of action.78 These
critics, however, did not quell what amounted to a popular demand for
consumer protection and business regulation.79 The convergence of these
three forces would lead states to enact their own Consumer Protection
Acts.80
II. THE MODERN CONSUMER PROTECTION MOVEMENT
A. The Post-War Economy
After “three years, eight months, and twenty-two days,” World War
73

See generally Id. at § 5; see also Shwartz & Silverman, supra note 66.
Shwartz & Silverman, supra note 66.
75
See Shepherd, supra note 7, at 5.
76
See Richard Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 47 n.1
(1969) (citing GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE FED. TRADE COMM’N: A STUDY IN ADMIN. L. AND
PROC. (1924); COMM’N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOV., TASK FORCE ON REG.
COMM’NS Appendix N (1949); J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE
PRESIDENT ELECT (1960); Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization
and Procedure, 48 MINN L. REV. 383, 383 (1964); E. COX, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, THE
CONSUMER AND THE FED. TRADE COMM’N (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. REC. E. 370 (daily
ed. Jan. 22, 1969); REP. OF THE ABA COMM’N TO STUDY THE FED. TRADE COMM’N (1969)).
See also FED. TRADE COMM’N MGMT. SURV. REP. OF ROBERT HELLER & ASSOCIATES, INC.
(1954); U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N, EVALUATION OF PERSONNEL (1965). Memorandum from
Philip Elman, F.T.C. Chairman on Admin. Reform, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to the Chairman of
the Senate Subcommittee on Admin. Practice and Procedure.
77
Posner, supra note 76, at 47.
78
Henry N. Butler & Joshua Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really LittleFTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 167 (2011).
79
Id.
80
Id.
74
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II ended for the United States.81 Domestically, the 1950s and 1960s were
marked by rapid acceleration toward a “consumer-oriented society.”82
The post-war era ushered in products and services that were becoming
increasingly complex.83 Local merchants began to give way to largescale business organizations.84 As the marketplace grew, so too did the
level of impersonal interactions between the merchant and the
consumer.85 Traditional consumer transactions, formerly resplendent
with “good will” and “mutual acquaintance,” gave way to adhesion
contracts and the rise of “deceptive trade practices, poor service and
shoddy merchandise.”86
When left unchecked either by the corporate entity or by the
executive branch, unscrupulous merchants “generally discovered that
they [could] impose upon consumers the cost of their own laxity, ‘sharp
trading’ or conscious deception because they [were] not adequately
disciplined by loss of good will in sales or by threat of effective legal
remedy from their customers.”87 These laissez faire attitudes toward
consumers would not, however, enjoy the longevity that caveat emptor
enjoyed during the prior two centuries.
B. New Jersey—Consumer “Liberty and Prosperity”88
In a flourishing post-war economy Americans came to believe that
they were entitled to “. . . a good life of material plenty, comfort, safety
and security.”89 As America moved into the 1960s, a portion of the
population began to experience a cultural awakening. During the 1960s
and 1970s, “quality-of-life” issues would become the focus of
governmental regulation.90 In an attempt to combat injustice, the federal

81
World War II, U.S. HISTORY, http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1661.html (last
visited May 10, 2018).
82
J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection Law: Judicial
Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 354 (1992).
83
Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 535 (1971) (noting that there can be no doubt, in
today’s society, sale of consumer goods, especially on an installment credit basis, has become
a matter of ever-increasing state of national anxiety); see also Shepherd, supra note 7, at 7.
84
William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724,
725 (1971).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 726.
88
Adopted in 1777, “Liberty and Prosperity” is the motto of the State of New Jersey.
See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:2-1(a) (West 1992).
89
Franke & Ballam, supra note 82, at 355. See generally MANSEL G. BLACKFORD & K.
AUSTIN KERR, BUS. ENTERPRISE IN AM. HIST. 12-17 (1986).
90
Franke & Ballam, supra note 82, at 355.
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government began to focus on issues such as: environmentalism,91 civil
rights,92 occupational safety,93 and consumer protection. States, such as
New Jersey, started to focus on these pressing social issues.
In 1960, the New Jersey marketplace was rife with fraudulent
practices.94 The dubious behavior of merchants did not escape the
attention of the legislative branch of New Jersey’s government. In
response to consumer complaints, and in an attempt to quell fraudulent
commercial practices, eleven senators moved a groundbreaking piece of
legislation by way of an emergency resolution.95 The situation was so
dire that on April 11, 1960, New Jersey Senator John A. Waddington,
along with ten fellow senators96 introduced S199, “An Act Concerning
Consumer Fraud, its Prevention, and Providing Penalties Therefor.”97
The Senate passed this legislation on May 9, 1960.98 Seven days after
passage in the Senate, the Assembly passed this emergency legislation.99
By the late spring of 1960, the legal principle of caveat emptor, which
previously placed the onus on the consumer to check the quality and
suitability of goods before making a purchase, was no longer welcome in
the Garden State. With the signature of Governor Robert B. Meyner, on
June 9, 1960, New Jersey became one of the first states in the country to
enact a consumer protection statute.100
C. New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act of 1960
Born from emergency legislation, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud
Act (“NJCFA” or the “Act”) contained only twelve sections.101 The

91

See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (2002).
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
93
See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970).
94
Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 11 (2004) (citing Cox v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 138 N.J. 2, 21 (1994)).
95
Id.
96
Sponsors for this consumer protection legislation included: Senators Donal Fox,
Thomas F. Connery, John A. Lynch, Anthony Grossi, Sido L. Ridolfi, Walter H. Jones,
Wesley L. Lance, Wayne Dumont, Jr., Robert Crane and William E. Ozzard.
97
Legislative History of R.S. 56:8-1 through 14 (March 17, 1971). It should be noted
that history surrounding the passage of this Act is scant to non-existent. According to a
handwritten note contained in the legislative history, the Governor’s statement on enacting
this legislation is “[n]ot in bound bills. Not with the histories for c. 40 & c. 41 (signed at the
same time). NJ Documents has no press releases for 1960.”
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Consumer Fraud Act, ch. 39, §§ 1-12, 1960 NJ Laws 137 (codified as amended at N.J.
Rev. Stat. §§ 56:8-1 to 56:8-195 (2016).
101
Id. § 13 ( “This act shall take effect immediately[.]”).
92
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NJCFA defined five terms: advertisement,102 Attorney General,103
merchandise,104 person,105 and sale.106 These terms form the foundation
of the NJCFA.107 Despite its diminutive size, the purpose of the Act was
clear:
[t]he purpose of this bill is to permit the Attorney General to
combat the increasingly widespread practice of defrauding
the public. The Authority conferred will provide effective
machinery to investigate and prohibit deceptive and
fraudulent advertising and selling practices
which have
caused extensive damage to the public.108
Absent from the statutory schema was the right of a private individual to
enforce violations of the Act. The NJFTC emulated the F.T.C.’s focus
on preventing consumer fraud, providing restitution to victims and
establishing the Attorney General as the chief law enforcement officer
responsible for enforcing the Act.109
The NJFTC vested the New Jersey Attorney General with sole
authority to investigate alleged violations of the newly minted consumer
fraud laws.110 The Legislature imbued the Attorney General with the
statutory tools necessary to protect consumers. To detect and quash
devious merchants, the Attorney General now had the power to require a
person to issue a written statement under oath,111 examine under oath any
person in connection with a questioned transaction,112 and examine and
even impound merchandise, records, books, documents, accounts or
papers.113 Further, to accomplish the objectives and carry out the duties
prescribed by the Act, the Attorney General was granted the power to
“issue subpoenas to any person, administer an oath . . . and conduct
hearings in aid of any investigation.”114 Finally, the Legislature granted
the Attorney General the greatest superpower of all, the ability to
102

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(a) (West 1960).
Id. at § 56:8-1(b).
104
Id. at § 56:8-1(c).
105
Id. at § 56:8-1(d).
106
Id. at § 56:8-1(e).
107
Over the next fifty-five years the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act would come to
include a total of 254 statutes, 30 of which would define an additional 186 terms. These
additional “definitions” frequently define the same term in multiple sections of the NJCFA.
See infra Sections on treatment of definitions sections.
108
Kugler v. Banner Pontiac-Buick, Opel, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 572, 577 (N.J. Ch. Div.
1972).
109
See Shepherd, supra note 7, at 6; see also Consumer Fraud Act, ch. 39, §§1-12, 1960
NJ Laws 137 (codified as amended at N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 56:8-1 to 56:8-148 (2010)).
110
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-3 (West 1960).
111
Id. at § 56:8-3(a).
112
Id. at § 56:8-3(b).
113
Id. at § 56:8-3(c)(d).
114
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-4 (West 1960).
103
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“promulgate such rules and regulations[,] which shall have the force of
law.”115 The authority to stamp out villainy in the marketplace had one
limitation; it had to be exercised to benefit the “public interest.” 116 The
state’s chief law enforcement officer would not neglect the exercise of
this power.
The codification of all rules and regulations made by the executive
branch, or its agencies, can be found in the New Jersey Administrative
Code (NJAC). Pursuant to the authority granted to the Attorney General
under the NJCFA, detailed and extensive regulations have been adopted
that govern both the sale of goods and the advertising practices of
merchants in the area of consumer sales.117 Although not adopted all at
once, the NJAC has gradually expanded to encompass twenty-seven
titles.118 For example, Title 13 addresses issues of law and public
safety.119 Within Title 13, Chapter 45A contains 258 code sections and
spans 266 pages setting forth the rules administered by the Division of
Consumer Affairs.120
Seven years after its enactment, an additional power was bestowed
upon the Attorney General.121 Once in receipt of evidence that a
provision of the NJCFA had been violated, the Attorney General was “. . .
empowered to hold hearings upon said violation and upon finding the
violation to have been committed, to assess a penalty against the person
alleged to have committed such violation[.]”122 Even to the most obtuse
merchant, there was little question at the time that the Legislature
intended to confer upon the Attorney General “the broadest kind of power
to act in the interest of the consumer public.”123 What merchants might
not have expected was the expansion of the NJCFA to include what
would become commonly referred to as “private attorneys general.”124

115

Id.
§ 56:8-3.
117
See generally N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:45A-1.1 (LEXIS 2018).
118
Id.; see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 1:1–9:67 (LEXIS 2018).
119
§ 13:45A-1.1.
120
Id.
121
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-3.1 (West 1967).
122
Id.
123
Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 537 (1971).
124
Lemellendo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 150 N.J. 255, 268 (1997). Cf. Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (“both statutes bring to
bear the pressure of ‘private attorneys general’ on a serious national problem for which public
prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate; the mechanism chose to reach the
objective . . . is the carrot of treble damages.”).
116
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D. The “Me Decade” and Caveat Venditor—”Let the Seller
Beware”
By 1971, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act suffered from three
problems. First, after eleven years, the authority to enforce the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act had remained solely within the Office of the
Attorney General. The resources of the executive branch were not
unlimited and the Attorney General could not prosecute every case.125
Second, an aggrieved individual was free to initiate a private cause of
action against a disreputable merchant. Under this schema, however, a
consumer was left with the arduous task of pleading, and ultimately
proving, common-law fraud causes of action against a seller. Third, in
many cases, the consumers’ claims were so small, the expense of hiring
an attorney so great and the legal requirements so complex that they
would simply abandon their claims.126 In 1971, proposed modifications
to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act were sought to ameliorate each
of these obstacles to consumer protection.
The Attorney General supported the proposed amendments to the
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.127 Attorney General Kugler directed a
letter to the Senators who supported the changes to the NJCFA. In his
letter, the Attorney General advised the Senators regarding what he
believed to be the most significant aspects of the proposed legislation:
[P]erhaps one of the most substantial and necessary remedies
provided by this legislation grants the consumer a private
right of action against persons violating the Consumer Fraud
Act. In addition, the provision mandates treble damages,
reasonable128attorneys’ fees and reasonable costs of suit in such
an action.
The Attorney General also stressed the socio-economic importance of the
proposed damage provisions:
[W]e found through our study that consumers are often
without adequate remedy for redressing violations such as
those contained in the Consumer Fraud Act. In addition, we
found that consumers most often cannot afford the cost of
pursuing what remedies they do have available and that
attorneys are not generally attracted to individual consumer
suits which involve a great amount of work and very little
monetary award. Consequently, we included the above
private right of action in order to provide a vehicle for private
consumer redress, to make that vehicle economically feasible
125

See Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557, 557 (2011).
Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Consumer Harm Acts? An Economic Analysis
of Private Actions Under State Consumer Protection Acts 2 (Nw. U. Sch. of L., Working
Paper No. 184, 2009).See also Skeer v. EMK Motors, Inc., 187 N.J. Super. 465, 512 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (discussing the cost of private litigation of consumer complaints).
127
Skeer, 187 N.J. Super. at 472.
128
Id. at 473.
126

SILVER

250

2018

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

to the private consumer and to make it economically and
professionally attractive to the attorneys of this State.
With the foresight and cooperation of the Legislature, these
recommendations became a reality.129
On June 21, 1971, Governor William T. Cahill enacted legislation
that gave New Jersey one of the strongest consumer protection laws in
the nation.130 The modifications to the NJCFA were specifically designed
to “provide increased protection for consumers.”131 The Governor’s
message heralded the newest modifications to the consumer protection
statute. In addition, the Governor’s press release, although not
considered part of the Act’s legislative history, confirms the unwavering
support of the executive branch for the Act that made New Jersey a leader
in consumer protection law.132
The 1971 amendments broadened the definition of consumer fraud,
streamlined enforcement procedures and increased the penalties for
violations of the Act.133 In passing upon the efficacy of the newly enacted
statutes, the Governor recognized that “. . . this bill coupled with recent
legislation, which created a new Division of Consumer Affairs gives New
Jersey the enforcement power it needs to protect the consumer.”134 With
this new grant of authority, the Attorney General now had the ability to
seek restitution of money or property for a defrauded consumer.135 In
addition, the Legislature empowered the Attorney General,
to enjoin the ownership or management of businesses used
for unlawful practices and after a hearing to order that money
acquired by unlawful means be restored to the consumer. The
bill also provides that the Attorney General have hearing
orders which are ignored, filed with the court as a136judgment
thus avoiding the need for further hearing or trial.
The Legislature did not limit the authority to combat consumer fraud to
the Attorney General. According to the Governor, this consumer
protection juggernaut expanded the NJCFA and authorized private
citizens to file actions against merchants alleging a violation of the
Consumer Fraud Act.137
Simply amending the NJCFA to provide a consumer with a private

129

Id. at 471.
Id.
131
Id. at 473.
132
See id. at 472 (discussing the meager legislative history and the fact that no hearing or
committee reports are available regarding the passage of these amendments).
133
Skeer, 187 N.J. Super. at 472. N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:8-1 to 56:8-1-20 (West 1971).
134
Skeer, 187 N.J. Super. at 471.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 472.
137
Id.
130
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cause of action against a merchant would not have dramatically altered
the consumer protection landscape. For the previous two centuries, an
aggrieved consumer was permitted to file a lawsuit against a merchant.
This, however, was not always a practical solution to a very real
problem.138 The poor and the powerless needed someone to champion
their causes of action. The NJCFA was enacted to fill that void. 139 The
ability to seek treble damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and reasonable
costs of suit would have a threefold effect on the consumer.140 Fee
awards would, “. . . provide easier access to the courts for the
consumer . . . increase the attractiveness of consumer actions to attorneys
and . . . help reduce the burdens on the Division of Consumer Affairs.”141
These remedies “reflect an apparent legislative intent to enlarge [the]
fraud-fighting authority [of the Act] and to delegate that authority among
various governmental and nongovernmental entities, each exercising
different forms of remedial power.”142
Consumer-plaintiffs would not be the only ones to feel the impact of
the amendments to the NJCFA. The punitive aspects of the Act were, by
design, meant to leave a lasting impression on the unprincipled merchants
and serve as a warning to others. The treble damage, fee-shifting and cost
of suit provisions were calculated to “. . . punish the wrongdoer and to
deter others from engaging in similar practices.”143 The judiciary’s
liberal interpretation of the Act, specifically regarding the attorneys’ fees,
would have a secondary effect on merchants. The award of attorney’s
fees would, “attract competent counsel to counteract the ‘community
scourge’ of fraud by providing an incentive for an attorney to take a case
involving a minor loss to the individual.”144 By 1971, consumers were
equipped with the tools necessary to level the playing field with
merchants and, for the most part, they did.
E. “To Infinity, and Beyond?”145
After almost 200 years of being alone in the marketplace, the
passage of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act signaled a departure from
the legal principle of caveat emptor (“buyer beware”). In just over ten
years after the NJCFA was enacted, the 1971 amendments to the Act
138

See id. (discussing the cost of private litigation and consumer complaints).
Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit, 207 N.J. 557, 585 (2011).
140
Skeer, 187 N.J. Super. at 472.
141
Id.
142
Gonzalez, 207 N.J. at 585.
143
Id. (emphasis added).
144
Sprenger v. Trout and Bridgeton Spring & Welding, 375 N.J. Super. 120 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2005) (citing Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc., 162 N.J. 134, 139 (1999)).
145
TOY STORY (Walt Disney Pictures 1995).
139
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dramatically changed the dynamic in commercial transactions. These
amendments ushered in an era of caveat venditor, “seller beware.” The
actions of all three branches of government put merchants on notice that
unscrupulous business practices would no longer be tolerated in New
Jersey.
The social norms and the needs of a society may change gradually,
or dramatically, over time. Changes in morality, ethics, technology, or
even catastrophic events bring to the fore the necessity of codifying new
laws or modifying the existing laws.146 Although the laws that influence
social behavior have the ability to change norms over time, they too may
require alterations to address societal changes. 147 The New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act is not impervious to the need for change.
Originally enacted to combat “sharp practices and dealings” that
preyed upon unknowing consumers by enticing them to purchase goods
or services through deceptive means,148 the Act, by its very nature, is
considered remedial legislation. To achieve the goal of the NJCFA,
Courts have resisted any effort “to import into the [NJ]CFA obstacles that
would impede access to the broad remedial protections for consumers that
our Legislature so obviously intended to create.”149 The consumer
protections set forth in the 1971 amendments are substantial. They would
not, however, be the only changes made to the NJCFA by the legislature.
As noted previously, New Jersey’s “Act Concerning Consumer
Fraud, its Prevention, and Providing Penalties Therefore” was original set
forth in one chapter.150 It was never the intention of the drafters to set
forth every prohibited practice.151
In Lemelledo v. Beneficial
Management Corp. of America, the defendant moved to dismiss the
plaintiff’s class action lawsuit by arguing that the NJCFA, and its
implementing regulations, did not specifically include a reference to
insurance.152 In denying the defendant’s request for relief the Supreme
Court explicitly acknowledged that the Act could never enumerate every
146
See What is Law Reform?, LAWGOVPOL, http://lawgovpol.com/what-is-law-reform/
(last visited May 10, 2018).
147
Clifton B. Parker, Laws May be Ineffective if They Don’t Reflect Social Norms,
Stanford Scholar Says, STANFORD NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014), https://news.stanford.edu/news/201
4/november/social-norms-jackson-112414.html.
148
Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 2 (1994) (citing D’Ercole Sales, Inc. v.
Fruehauf Corp., 206 N.J. Super. 11 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1985)).
149
Boseland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 559 (2009). For a comprehensive
analysis of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act see PAUL DEPETRIS, N.J. CONSUMER FRAUD
ACT & FORMS 9 (2017).
150
Consumer Fraud Act, ch. 39, §§1-12, 1960 NJ Laws 137 (codified as amended at N.J.
REV. STAT. §§ 56:8-1 to 56:8-195 (2016).
151
See Lemelledo v. Benefical Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 150 N.J. 255, 265 (1997).
152
Id.
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possible evil that it was created to combat. The Court found:
[t]he fertility of [human] invention in devising new schemes
of fraud is so great . . . the CFA could not possibly enumerate
all, or even most, of the areas and practices that it covers
without severely retarding its broad remedial powers
to root
out fraud in its myriad, nefarious manifestations.153
The Court also noted the futility of having the Legislature set forth each
and every type of fraud in the Consumer Fraud Act.154 In doing so, the
Court paid homage to the language of the holding in Federal Trade
Comm’n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,155 wherein the United States
Supreme Court found that,
[e]ven if all known unfair practices where specifically
defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin
[redrafting
the list] again [,constituting] . . . an endless
task.156
Nevertheless, in an attempt to clarify the Act and define acceptable
contemporary behavior between merchants and consumers, the New
Jersey Legislature would add new provisions to the NJCFA.
As originally enacted, the NJCFA contained twelve statutory
provisions.157 Now, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act contains
twenty-eight, frequently undesignated, subchapters.158 Presently, there
are 254 consumer protection statutes spanning 106 pages.159 While the
text of the original Act contained only five definitions,160 it now contains
thirty different definition sections that cover 186 terms. 161 Figure 1 sets
153

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
155
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 240 (1972).
156
Id. at 240. See Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc. 197 N.J. 543, 556 (2009) (stating the
judiciary will “construe the [CFA] broadly, not in a crabbed fashion.”).
157
Consumer Fraud Act, ch. 39, §§1-12, 1960 NJ Laws 137 (codified as amended at N.J.
REV. STAT. §§ 56:8-1 to 56:8-195 (2016)).
158
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 to 56:8-195 (West 2016).
159
Id.
160
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1(a)-(e) (West 1960).
161
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.15 (West 1982);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.29 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-14.2 (West 2017); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 56:8-22 (West 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-39 (West 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:8-49 (West 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-53.1 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-55
(West 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-62 (West 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-67 (West 1997);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-83 (West 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-86 (West 1998); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-93 (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-99 (West 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8104 (West 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-108 (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-110 (West
2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-115 (West 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-120 (West 2003);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-130 (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-137 (West 2014); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-153 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-157 (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56:8-161 (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-170 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-175
(West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-185 (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-196 (West
2014).
154
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forth the 298 amendments to the NJCFA since it was enacted by the
Legislature.162
Figure 1: Amendments to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
From 1966 through 2017.
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It should come as no surprise that the expansion of the Consumer
Fraud Act to permit private causes of action, treble damages and
attorneys’ fees contributed to the deluge of consumer protection
litigation.163 Consumer actions in either tort or general litigation were
outnumbered by private complaints filed pursuant to the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act. The increase in litigation from 2000 to 2009
brought with it an increase in the number of reported consumer protection
decisions.164 During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the
number of reported decisions increased by 447 percent.165 Using
published decisions as a milestone for measuring the amount of consumer
protection litigation, New Jersey easily exceeded the national trend.166
162
The NJCFA Amendments were calculated by reviewing each statute, the date that the
section was proposed and amended prior to or after enactment.
163
See Shepherd, supra note 7 (Regarded as a thoughtful treatment of the consequences
of New Jersey’s expansion of the Consumer Fraud Act).
164
See Shepherd, supra note 7.
165
See Shepherd, supra note 7.
166
Shepherd, supra note 7.
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Figure 2: Trends in Consumer Protection Litigation 2000-2009;
New Jersey versus the National Average.

The increase in published opinions, supports the supposition that New
Jersey enjoys one of the country’s strongest consumer protection acts in
the country. This approach, however, is not the only method to confirm
that New Jersey leads the country in “pro-plaintiff” consumer laws.
Developed in 2009, the Expected Value Index (EVI) serves as
another method to determine the extent to which a statute is likely to
encourage litigation.167 An act may contain a significant number of
statutes that make it easier for a plaintiff to prevail in an action, thereby
making it more likely a plaintiff will institute their lawsuit. These types
of Acts receive a high EVI score. Between 2000 and 2013, New Jersey
had the largest change in EVI of the states examined.168

167
JAMES C. COOPER & MATTHEW D. SIBERY, SEARLE CIV. JUST. INST., STATE CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT LITIGATION: UPDATES ON TRENDS 8 (2016).
168
Id. at 11.
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Figure 3. Top EVI Growth: Without Definitional Changes.169

Despite New Jersey’s high EVI score, in recent years it appears
that a plateau has been reached.170 The New Jersey judiciary would have
an opportunity to interpret Consumer Fraud Act in the years following its
passage. The judiciary would not be the only branch of government that
would concern itself with various provisions of the Act.
III. WHERE DOES THE LAW GO FROM HERE?
A. The Structure of the Act.
For over fifty years, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act has
been amended by the Legislature in an attempt to protect consumers. In
its current form, the Act looks radically different than it did when it was
originally enacted by the Legislature. The Act began with twelve statutes
and now contains 195 sequentially numbered statutes set forth within
twenty-eight frequently undesignated subchapters.171 When N.J.S.A.
56:8-2 was originally enacted, it was titled, “Unlawful Practice.”172 In its
current form, section two now contains thirty-two separate statutes and

169
170
171
172

Id.
Id. at 14.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 to 56:8-195 (West 2016).
§ 56:8-2.
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two acts.173 At first blush, the statutes appear to have been added
chronologically; the structure of the NJCFA, however, is not that simple.
As substantive statutes were added to the Act, so too were statutes
that sought to define the terms contained in the newly added code
sections. The Act now contains thirty separate and distinct definition
statues that define 186 terms.174 These new sections frequently duplicate
terms that have already been defined by the Act. The term “director,”
pertaining to the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs in the
Department of Law and Public Safety, is defined thirteen times in thirteen
separate statutes within the Act.175 The presence of these duplicative
definitions tends to make the Act cumbersome and difficult to navigate.
To many, the arrangement of the Act is as confusing as it is
redundant. It may be beneficial to reorganize the Act to clarify confusing
provisions and excise redundancies. First, duplicative definitions could
be eliminated in an effort to streamline and simplify the Act.176
Additionally, sections of general applicability should be grouped
together.177 Finally, rather than being set forth in a chronological order
the statutes should be organized by subject matter.178
Review of the statute by the New Jersey Law Revision
Commission (“NJLRC” or “Commission”) has resulted in the
consideration of revisions to the structure of the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act as follows179:
1. Generally applicable provisions
a. Definitions.180
§ 56-2 (including the “Refund Policy Disclosure Act of 1982” (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:82.14 (West 1982)) and the “Raincheck Policy Disclosure Act of 2006” (N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56:8-2.28 (West 2006))).
174
See Shepherd, supra note 7.
175
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-22 (West 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-26 (West 2008);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-39 (West 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-49 (West 1991); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-62 (West 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-67 (West 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:886 (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-93 (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-99 (West
2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-120 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-137 (West 2004); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 56:8-170 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-175 (West 2007); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-185 (West 2009).
176
See Memorandum from Susan Thatch, to the New Jersey Law Rev. Comm. 4 (Mar. 9,
2015).
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id. The proposed revisions represent the preliminary assessment of the statute
performed by Susan Thatch. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.4 (West 1973).
180
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 (West 1960); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.15 (West 1982);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.29 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-14.2 (West 1999); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 56:8-22 (West 1975); § 56:8-39; § 56:8-49; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-53.1 (West
2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-55 (West 1991); § 56:8-62; § 56:8-67; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8173
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b. General Fraud.181
c. Remedies and Construction of the
Act.182
d. Attorney General’s Authority,
Enforcement Powers, and
Penalties.183
e. Civil Cause of Action and
Penalties.184
f. Promulgation of Regulations.185
g. Severability.186
h. Educational Programs related to the
CFA.187
2. Merchandise
a. Advertisement of Unassembled
Merchandise as Assembled in
Picture or Illustration;
Prohibition.188

83 (West 1996); § 56:8-86; § 56:8-93; § 56:8-99; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-104 (West 2000);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-108 (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. §. 56:8-110 (West 2002); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-115 (West 2002); §. 56:8-120; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-130 (West 2003); § 56:8137; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-153 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-157 (West 2005); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §. 56:8-161 (West 2005); § 56:8-170 ; § 56:8-175; § 56:8-185; N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56:8-196 (West 2014).
181
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 1960).
182
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.13 (West 1979).
183
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-3 to 14.4 (West 1960); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-15 to 18
(West 1971).
184
§ 56:8-15; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-20 (West
1999).
185
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.32 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-14.7 (West 1999);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-24 (West 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-25 (West 1975); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-28 (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-31 (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:836 (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-48 (West 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-52(b) (West
1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-53.5 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-56(c) (West 1991);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-59 (West 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-78 (West 1995); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-89 (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-97 (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8111 (West 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-118 (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-134 (West
2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-138.2 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-147 (West 2004);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-152 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-165 (West 2005); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:8-174 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-180 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56:8-195 (West 2009).
186
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-12 (West 1960).
187
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-14.5 (West 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-14.6 (West 1999).
188
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.4 (West 1973).
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b. Sale, Attempt to Sell or Offer for
Sale of Merchandise Without Tag
or Label with Selling Price.189
c. Copy of Transaction or Contract;
Provision to Customer.190
d. “Going Out of Business Sale”;
Time Limits.191
e. Refund Policy Disclosure Act.192
f. Solicitation of Used Goods or
Wares by Profit-Making Enterprise;
Disclosures.193
g. Misrepresentation of Geographic
Origin or Location of
Merchandise.194
h. Raincheck Policy Disclosure Act.195
i. Unit Price Disclosure Act.196
j. Resale of Tickets.197
k. Health Clubs.198
l. Child Product Safety.199
m. Information Services.200
n. Change in Telecommunications
Services Providers.201
o. Pet Purchase Protection Act.202
p. Unlawful Selling of Certain
Merchandise at Excessive Price
During a State of Emergency.203

189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.5 (West 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.6 (West 1973).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.22 (West 1982).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.8 (West 1979).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-2.14 to 56:8-2.21 (West 1982).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.23 (West 1985).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.25 (West 1997).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-2.28 to 56:8-2.32 (West 2006).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-21 to 56:8-25 (West 1975).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-26 to 56:8-38 (West 2008).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-39 to 56:8-48 (West 1987).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-49 to 56:8-53.5 (West 1991).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-54 to 56:8-60 (West 1991).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-86 to 56:8-91 (West 1998).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-92 to 56:8-97 (West 1999).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-107 to 56:8-109 (West 2001).
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205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
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q. Gift Certificate or Card; Value;
Expiration; Dormancy Fee; Balance
Under Five Dollars; Penalty.204
r. Prepaid Calling Cards and
Services.205
Food and Drugs
a. Sale of Non-Prescription Drugs,
Infant Formula and Baby Food
Beyond Expiration Date.206
b. Halal Food Consumer Protection
Act.207
c. Kosher Food Consumer Protection
Act.208
d. Misrepresentation of Identity of
Food in Menus or Advertisements
of Eating Establishments.209
e. Unsolicited Credit Cards and
Checks.210
Cars
a. Sale of Used Cars.211
b. Motor Vehicle Window Tinting.212
c. Sale of Vehicle Protection Product
Warranties.213
Construction
a. Contractors’ Registration Act.214
b. Contractors’ Contracts; Required
Terms and Conditions.215
Employment and Conditions of
a. Temporary Help Services.216

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-110 to 56:8-112 (West 2012).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-175 to 56:8-181 (West 2007).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.27 (West 1998).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-98 to 56:8-103 (West 2000).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-61 to 56:8-66 (West 1994).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-2.9 to 56:8-2.12 (West 1979).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-153 to 56:8-156 (West 2004).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8- 67 to 56:8-80 (West 1997).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-117 (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-118 (West 2003).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-167 (West2007).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-136 to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-152 (West 2004).
Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1.1 to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8.2 (West 2007).
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b. International Labor Matching.217
c. Industrial Hygienist Truth in
Advertising Act.218
d. Exemption from Consumer Fraud
Law, Certain Real Estate
Licensees.219
7. Fraudulent and Unlawful Practices
a. Operation Simulating
Governmental Agency as
Unlawful Practice.220
b. Scheme to Not Sell Item or Service
Advertised.221
c. Notification to Person that He Has
Won Prize and Requiring Him to
Perform Act.222
d. Solicitation of Funds or
Contributions, or Sale or Offer for
Sale of Goods or Services Under
False Representation of
Solicitation for Charitable or
Nonprofit Organization or of
Benefit for Handicapped
Persons.223
e. Senior Citizens; Home Solicitation
for Certain Loans Prohibited.224
f. Safety Professional Truth in
Advertising Act.225
g. Telemarketing Calls.226
h. Unsolicited Advertisements Over
Telephone Lines.227

217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-185 to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-195 (West 2009).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-81 to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-85 (West 1996).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19.1 (West 2004).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.1 (West 1968).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.2 (West 1969).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8.2.3 (West 1969).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.7 (West 2017).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-104 to 56:8-106 (West 2000).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-113 to 56:8-116 (West 2002).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-119 to 56:8-135 (West 2003).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-157 to 56:8-160 (West 2005).
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Security of Personal
Information.228
Internet Dating Safety Act.229

The proposed structural reorganization would clarify and simplify the Act
making it easier for practitioners and laypersons to navigate and
understand.
B. Substantive Changes to the Act
New Jersey’s case law pertaining to the NJCFA navigates the
broad concepts set forth in the Act. In the absence of an extensive
legislative history,230 the judiciary has been called upon to interpret
significant aspects of the Act, including: pre-suit demand for a refund;
the extraterritorial application of the Act to nationwide class actions; feeshifting for technical violations;231 and mandatory treble damages.232
Recently, legislation has been introduced in an effort to amend or codify
the aforementioned issues.233
Over the past several years, bills regarding the Consumer Fraud
Act have been introduced in the Legislature. The bills identified in this
Article that were introduced in prior legislative sessions have not yet
moved through the legislative process nor have they been enacted. The
bills introduced in the 2018-2019 legislative session have not had the
opportunity to move through the process as of publication. As a result,
although the Commission does not generally work in areas that are a
current focus of the Legislature, the fact that the legislative proposals
currently under consideration do not comprehensively address all the
issues the NJLRC has reviewed means that the NJLRC has continued to
work in the area of consumer fraud with the expectation of furnishing a
“Final Report” to the Legislature, that supplements and supports the work
being done by that august body.

228

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-161 to 56:8-166 (West 2006).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-168 to 56:8-174 (West 2007).
230
Skeer v. EMK Motors, Inc., 187 N.J. Super. 465, 471 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
231
B.J.M. Insulation & Constr., Inc. v. Evans, 287 N.J. Super. 513, 517 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1996).
232
N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 (2016).
233
Assemb. 303, 218th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2018); see also Assemb. 1556, 218th Leg.,
1st Sess. (N.J. 2018) (discussing proposed revisions to regarding the pre-suit demand
requirement under certain circumstances).
229
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C. Plaintiff’s Pre-Suit Demand
In Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc.234 a consumer purchased a
vehicle from an automobile dealer. At the time of her purchase, the buyer
was unaware that the seller had included undisclosed service fees in her
registration paperwork.235 Rather than seek a refund of these fees, the
buyer filed a complaint against the defendant and alleged a violation of
the Consumer Fraud Act.236 In dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint, the
trial court found that “she never complained about these charges . . . [and]
these fees were Defendant[‘]s profit . . . paid without objection.”237 The
Appellate Division disagreed with the lower court’s dismissal of the
plaintiff’s cause of action and explicitly rejected the premise that a presuit demand was required in order to sustain an action under the
NJCFA.238 The defendant’s petition for certification, on the issue of
whether a pre-suit demand was an essential prerequisite for a CFA claim
was granted by the New Jersey Supreme Court.239
In reviewing this matter, the Court examined the plain language
of the Consumer Fraud Act.240 The Court explicitly found that: “[t]he
plain language of the CFA [did] not . . . impose upon any putative
plaintiff the requirement that he or she first seek a remedy directly from
the offending merchant.” Rather, “any person who suffers an
ascertainable loss” resulting from a defendant’s violation of the CFA may
file an action.241 The Court went on to find that reading a pre-suit demand
requirement into the Act could conceivably “permit practices that the
statute was designed to deter . . . to continue unabated and
unpunished.”242 Given the clear legislative intent to “empower
consumers to seek to secure relief for themselves and for others who may
not be aware that they have been victimized,” the court refused to adopt
this requirement.243
The Court acknowledged that it could imagine circumstances in
which a pre-suit demand for relief might be appropriate.244 Unwavering
in its holding, the Court explained that “the language and intent of the
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244

Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 543 (2009).
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 550.
Id.
Bosland, 197 N.J. at 557.
Id.
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id. at 562.
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statute are clear . . . its purposes are plain” and that the requirement of a
pre-suit demand for relief, “call[s] for an examination and weighing of
public policy considerations not within the language of the CFA itself.”245
In affirming the decision of the Appellate Court, the Supreme Court
advised the defendants that the requirement of a pre-suit demand for a
refund involved, “an examination and a weighing of public policy
considerations that . . . are [reserved] for the Legislature.246 Such a
consideration follows.
It appears that, after examining the subject matter and weighing
the public policy considerations set forth in Bosland, Assembly Bills
A303247 and A1556248 were pre-filed for introduction during the 20182019 legislative session. Each bill seeks to amend N.J. Rev. Stat. § 56:819. Although these two bills vary slightly in their approach, both require
an aggrieved consumer issue a pre-suit demand for a refund upon the
seller. These bills seek to avoid the use of the NJCFA to punish
merchants for accidental violations of the Act or honest mistakes made
during the course of a consumer transaction. Furthermore, the
requirement that a plaintiff file a pre-suit demand for relief appears to be
consistent with New Jersey’s long-standing policy requiring plaintiffs to
seek “mitigation” in all cases involving claims for damages.249
D. “Only In New Jersey”
As a state with some of the strongest remedies for consumers, the
possibility exists that out-of-state litigants may wish to avail themselves
of New Jersey’s Consumer Protection statutes.250 The traditional rule is
that litigation is conducted on behalf of the individual named parties

245

Id.
Bosland, 197 N.J. at 562.
247
Assemb. 303, 218th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2018).
248
Assemb. 1556, 218th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2018).
249
See, e.g., State by Comm’r of Transp. v. Weiswasser, 149 N.J. 320 (1997) (finding
condemnee seeking severance damages in partial-taking condemnation action has duty to
mitigate those damages); Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat’l Bank, 653 F.2d 779 (3d
Cir. 1981) (remanding an action against bank for wrongful conversion of sand to determine
whether buyer reasonably discharged their duty to mitigate damages under New Jersey law
for lost profits); Fanarjian v. Moskowitz, 237 N.J. Super. 395 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)
(stating commercial landlords have duty to mitigate damages.); Frank Stamato & Co. v.
Borough of Lodi, 4 N.J. 14, 21 (1950) (involving the requirement to mitigate damages in a
contract action); Ostrowski v. Azzara, 111 N.J. 429, 437 (1988) (analyzing the mitigation of
damages in a tort action); Covino v. Peck, 233 N.J. Super. 612, 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989); Stark v. Nat’l Research and Design Corp., 33 N.J. Super. 315, 323 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div.1954) (illustrating breach of an agreement for assignment of lease of business
premises).
250
See Shepherd, supra note 7, at 18.
246
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only.251 If, however, a litigant believes that his or her claim against a
corporation is too small or the expense of prosecuting such a claim is too
large, they may seek to initiate class action litigation.252 If specific
requirements are met,253 a trial court may certify a class action in order to
equalize the ability of the claimants to, “prepare and pay for the advocacy
of their rights.”254 To the consternation of the business community, New
Jersey courts have determined that class actions are one mechanism that
a plaintiff may employ in order to litigate consumer fraud actions. 255
In International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 68 v.
Merck & Co., Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the
frequency of nationwide class certification is rare.256 The scrutiny that
potential plaintiffs are required to undergo in order to be certified as a
nationwide class frequently results in the denial of class certification.257
The Court also noted that, “[the] application of the law of a single state
to all members of such a class is even more rare.”258 Under the right
circumstances, however, the possibility remains that the size of a class
could be expanded to include non-New Jersey residents whenever a New
Jersey corporation is a defendant.
In an attempt to narrow the use of the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act by out-of-state litigants or nationwide classes, legislation has
been introduced that would limit the Act solely to New Jersey
residents.259 Under the proposed legislation, the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act would “apply only to New Jersey residents, or to transactions
that take place in the State.”260 Clarifying the extraterritorial application
of the NJCFA would make it clear that the purpose of the Act is to protect
New Jersey consumers.261 The proposed legislation would not, however,
251
252

Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 46 (2017).
Id. at 46; see Frink v. Ricoh Corp., 365 N.J. Super. 520, 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.

2003).
253
A discussion of the requirements necessary to certify a class action are beyond the
scope of this note. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:32-1(a); see generally PAUL DEPETRIS, N.J.
CONSUMER FRAUD ACT & FORMS 1 (2017) (discussing class actions in the context of the
Consumer Fraud Act).
254
Frink, 365 N.J. Super. at 537.
255
Id.
256
Int’l Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., Inc.
192 N.J. 372, 394 n.3 (2007).
257
See id. Beegal v. Park West Gallery, 394 N.J. Super. 98, 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2007); Hannan v. Weichert South Jersey, No. A-5525-05T5, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS
1238, at *35-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. April 17, 2007).
258
Id.
259
Assemb. 303, 218th Leg., 1st Sess., at § 2 (N.J. 2018).
260
Id.
261
See Shepherd, supra note 7, at 18.
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eliminate an out-of-state consumer’s cause of action, in either contract or
tort, against a New Jersey based company.
E. Treble Damages; Fee Awards For Technical Violations.
i. Treble Damages
Since 1971, individual consumers have been permitted to bring
private actions to recover refunds and treble damages for violations of the
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.262 To be eligible to collect treble
damages, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct was
unlawful and demonstrate an ascertainable loss.263 In addition, the
claimant must also establish “a causal relationship between the unlawful
conduct and the ascertainable loss.”264 If a plaintiff is successful in
proving all three of the aforementioned elements then the award of legal
and/or equitable relief, treble damages and reasonable attorney’s fees are
mandatory.265 For the purpose of imposing treble damages, the NJCFA
does not discriminate between a nefarious merchant and one who was
acting in good faith with no intent to defraud a consumer.
ii. Technical Violations
In New Jersey, if a consumer-fraud plaintiff is able to prove both
an unlawful practice under the NJCFA and an ascertainable loss then an
award of treble damages and attorneys’ fees is mandatory under N.J. Rev.
Stat. § 56:8-19.266 The compulsory language of the statute would be
tested in a case involving a “technical” violation of the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act.
The defendant in BJM Insulation & Construction, Inc. v.
Evans,267 having been sued for an alleged breach of a home repair
contract, denied the allegations and interposed a defense that the plaintiff
had, among other things, violated the Consumer Fraud Act.268 After
completing discovery, the defendant successfully moved for summary
judgment.269 The trial court judge noted in the order of dismissal that the

262

Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 50-51 (2017).
Id. at 52.
264
Id.
265
Id. at 80.
266
BJM Insulation & Constr., Inc. v. Evans, 287 N.J. Super. 513, 513 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1996) (citing Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2 (1994)).
267
Id.
268
Id. at 515.
269
Id.
263

SILVER

2018]

2018

HERO OR VILLAIN

267

plaintiff had violated the provisions of the CFA. 270 The trial court,
however, denied the defendant’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs.271
The defendant appealed this decision.272
The Appellate Division held, “. . . the question of whether a trial
judge has the discretion to deny counsel fees to a successful claimant of
Consumer Fraud Act protection is no longer an open one.”273 The Court
made it clear that if a consumer-fraud plaintiff is able to prove both an
unlawful practice under the NJCFA and an ascertainable loss then an
award of attorneys’ fees is mandatory under N.J. Rev. Stat. § 56:8-19.274
Finding that reasonable counsel fees serve as a financial obligation owed
by a claimant, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument suggesting that
a separate, “ascertainable loss” must be proffered before one could
recoup counsel fees and costs.275 The Court reasoned that, “. . . the plain
sense of the Act . . . [is] to ensure that the financial burden to one who
claims the Act’s protection is minimized . . . .”276
Finally, the Court addressed the plaintiff’s argument that any
transgression of the Act should be forgiven because it was merely a
“technical” violation.277 To this request for leniency, the Court could
only find one answer, “. . . the Consumer Fraud Act [would make] no
distinction between ‘technical’ violations and more ‘substantive’
ones.”278 A dispensation for technical violations of the Act would require
legislative intervention.
Assembly Bill A303 has been introduced to the Legislature to
address the mandatory imposition of treble damages and attorneys’ fees
against merchants whose alleged violation of the Act is technical in
nature. If enacted, this legislation would effectively amend N.J. Rev.
Stat. § 56:8-19 to leave the imposition of treble damages against a vendor
to the discretion of the trial court judge. The relevant portion of the
statute would be amended to read:
In any action under this section, the court may, in addition to
any other appropriate legal or equitable relief, award up to
threefold279the actual damages sustained by any person in
interest.
270

Id.
BJM Insulation & Constr., Inc., 287 N.J. Super. at 513.
272
Id.
273
Id. (citing Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2 (1994)).
274
Id. at 516.
275
Id. at 517.
276
Id.
277
BJM Insulation & Constr., 287 N.J. Super. at 517.
278
Id. at 518.
279
Assemb. 303, 218th Leg., 1st Sess., at § 7(a) (N.J. 2018). The italicized text represents
the proposed changes to the statute.
271
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In addition, subsection c.1 of this bill provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection a. of this
section, attorneys’ fees, filing fees, and reasonable costs of
suit shall not be awarded for a technical violation of P.L. 196,
c.39 (C.56:8-1 et seq.).
In order to be exonerated for a “technical violation” of the Act, the
merchant must have been acting in “good faith” and with “no intent to
defraud the consumer.”280 In addition, the violation must neither impact
the quality of the product nor service provided,281 nor result in an
ascertainable loss to the person.282 The proposed legislation appears to
provide those who technically violate the NJCFA with the dispensation
denied to the plaintiff in BJM Insulation & Construction, Inc. v. Evans.
Since the Commission has not yet completed its process in this
area of the law and has not issued a formal recommendation regarding
modifications to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act it will continue to
monitor the pending legislation and engage in outreach to the
stakeholders and scholars in this area in order to provide support to the
Legislature.
IV. CONCLUSION
The interactions between consumers and merchants that were
once parochial and familiar have become more cosmopolitan and
impersonal. Over time, the bedrock legal principle of caveat emptor
began to crumble with the collective realization that innocent people
deserved to be protected from the “thieves, forgers and rapscallions”283
among us.
Forged from the irons of the American Industrial Revolution, the
federal government established the Federal Trade Commission. In the
years that followed, the F.T.C. would come to protect consumers from
deceptive practices and acts in commerce. By 1960, New Jersey
recognized the necessity of defending its own citizenry from the
predatory practices of unscrupulous merchants. Thereafter, and for over
a decade, the Attorney General emerged as an individual anointed by the
Legislature to shield consumers from harm. This “army of one” would
soon be joined by legions of “private attorneys general” each of whom
would come armed with the sword of mandatory treble damages and
attorneys’ fees.

280
281
282
283

Id. at § 7(c)(2).
Id. at § 7(c)(2)(a).
Id. at § 7(c)(2)(b).
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (remarks of Representative Farnsworth).
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A hero is “a [person] admired for [their] achievements and noble
qualities and considered a model or ideal.”284 With the advent of modern
consumer protection laws, the marketplace now contains two powerful
factions—merchants and consumers. For some, the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act is lauded as the hero of the consumer protection
movement. For others, it is the villain of all commercial enterprises. The
answer to the question of whether the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
is a “hero” or a “villain” is clear to those who champion a specific interest.
For those in the middle, the question will remain as difficult to answer as
which superheroes are better “Marvel or DC?”

284

Hero, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1986).

